THE PRUSSIANS AND THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD

At the turn of the XIV and XV century the political situation between Poland and the Teutonic Order was leading to major military conflict. Both sides, through very active diplomacy, were trying to gain as many allies as possible. From a time perspective it became apparent that the Polish Crown in isolation was not able to overcome the military power of the Teutonic Knights, who were supported by the knighthood of Western Europe and particularly that of Germany.
The Polish King, Wladislav Jagiello, a Lithuanian by birth, was extremely conscious of this, and all Polish diplomatic efforts were directed at securing the support of the Lithuanians, the Ruthenes, the Tartars and all Slav peoples. And these, under Polish leadership, were shortly to stand in armed solidarity against the Teutonic Knighthood.

The description of the battle carried down through the centuries contain many inaccuracies, but are often taken as certain. I would also point out a lack of any mention about the part played by native Prus peoples in this armed conflict.
Roughly in this period of time, in 1397, the Prus nobles from the Ziemia Chelminska region formed an organisation called the Lizard Society. Semi-secret, even to day we do not know the names of all the participants. The Society was tolerated and even approved of by the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, probably only because this made it easier to track its activities and intentions. The aims of the Society were sympathetic with social will of linking Prussia with the Polish Crown.
The immediate entourage of Jagiello, as the King himself, were without doubt in contact with “Lizards and knew exactly, in secret from the Teutonic Knights, about their negatives views as to the Order.
At the very least, The King had one more ally, and they were the Prus nobles, who, as was to be seen, had a significant role in the result of the battle of Grunwald.
Judging by the number of seals, the number of member of the Lizard Society can be put at 26, mostly from the knights of the Chelminski Standarts (or cavalry brigades) formed out of the Prus nobility. Such a “Standard” was formed from about 300 armoured riders, but bound by the knightly oath of allegiance to serve the Teutonic Order.
Right from the beginning of the preparations for war both sides utilised military intelligence. Although in the art of spying the lead was taken by the ruthless and hated Teutonic Knights, they could not count on the sympathy or loyalty of their subjects. From the start of the march of the Polish forces, the Order knew that they were misinformed by their Prus subjects about the route taken by Jagiello‘s army.
The chief scout of the allied armies was the Prus Jan Grinwald, who was tied by bonds of friendship to John of Durag, a Prus knight. After the battle of Grunwald it was John of Durag who sacked the castle of Ostroda for Jagiello.
On the Prus lands, at Kurzetniki, Jagiello was informed that the Order had prepared an ambush if his army attempted to ford the river Drweca.
For the Order, This was their first defeat, as Jagiello‘s army marched on, and did not attempt to cross the river at this Drweca ford.
From this moment on, the Knights of the Cross must have fully realised that there was no chance of luring the allied armies into a trap during their march. They therefor quickly moved to the plains of Grunwald where it was expected that the main battle would take place.
The Teutonic Order‘s strategy was the coming of their knightly forces before Jagiello‘s army, occupying the most the most advantageous positions in the area and waiting. In other words the battle was to to evolve according their previously thought out tactics.The positions which they took up in the Stebark triangle, which we call the left wing, Lodwigowo the right wing, and Grunwald, where the Order pitched its camp, at the back of these wings.
The topography of the Order‘s positions was roughly that in front of the left wing the land was gently structured and not forested, but on the right hand was hilly and at the end was a forest.
The distance between Stebark and Lodwigowo was about 3 kilometres.

The Orders left wing was composed of light armed knights, as was shown in the pursuit of the light cavalry of the Lithuanians, Ruthenes and Tartars. Most of the artillery was positioned at the front with numerous infantry. In front of the cannons positions, trenches were dug as protection against cavalry.
The right wing started after a gap of several handred metres from the left, and ended inin the forested area. The use of a gap between the wings was to facilitate the bringing on of reinforcements either to the left or right wing. The use of artillery on the right wing, because of hilly terrain, was of little use, but the terrain made possible the hiding of substantial forces behind hills as well as in the woods.
The strategy of Ulrich von Jungingen was to draw the attention of Jagiello to the visible in the open fields the armoured knights and the artillery. He expected that it was there that the main forces of Jagiello would attack. He planned that in in the course of the battle he would, through the gap between wings, introduce the reserves of heavily armed knights, and some of the knights from the right wing to attack Jagiello‘s main forces from the side. Every strategist would call this a tragedy, in other words the end of the battle.
It should be noted how well informed Jagiello was,as his command position was on the same side as von Jungingen.
In summary, the battle was to start as the Order wished, with their forces ready to withstand, in their defensive positions, the attack of the forces of Jagiello, so as to launch a deadly counter offensive at the right moment.
Could Jagiello expect all this?
Certainly, Jagiello could expect anything, particularly after the unsuccessful attempt at ambush at the ford in Kurzetnik.
It was essential to have information about the earlier arrival on the field of battle of the enemy, about his relocation, fortifications, strength and numbers etc.
Without this basic knowledge even the best commander might not overcome the enemy, as obtaining this knowledge during the course of the battle could be too late and lead to catastrophe.
A few hours before Jagiello arrived on the field of battle and about is before it commenced, two members of the Lizard Society came to see the King. They were Prus knights from the Chelminski Standard, Nicholas of Pilewic and John of Pulkowo, the brother of Nicholas Rynski a commander in the Chelminski Standard. Without doubt, they had all the necessary information on the Order‘s camp and locations which would have interested the King and the purpose of their visit was to pass information to Jagiello.
Further, I would point out that in meantime the Prus knight Hanko of the coat of arms of Ostoya informed the King that he had seen patrols of Teutonic Knights very close to the Royal Camp, which was soon confirmed by others.
Jagiello, before the start of the battle, doubtless also sent out his own patrols, to get confirmation provided by the Prus knights and also because it was necessary to obtain knowledge about the terrain his forces would have to move over.
All this information led the King, his Council and Commanders to decide on strategy and accordingly to give orders about the disposition of various forces to the right positions before the commencement of the battle.
The time o the start of the battle became prolonged, and this created great irritation for the Grand Master of the Order. The day was extremely hot, and the knights of the Order were in heavy armour in defensive positions which in case they were permitted to leave. The situation became critical insofar as to how long heavily encased in steel knights could be kept under the blazing sun.
Urlich von Jungingen sends a delegation with two swords to provoke Jagiello to commence battle. The King, very experienced in warfare, does not fall for this primitive trick, and is even more convinced that the provocations are aimed at forcing him into a trap.

The battle o Grunwald started with a charge on the Order‘s left wing by the lightly armed Lithuanians, Ruthenes and Tartars. They crossed the trenches and cut to pieces the Order‘s cannoniers and then came to face more heavily armed knights. They carried out their task but their losses were heavy.
The eastern style of warfare in such a situation demanded retreat and regrouping. The Teutonic Knights made a mistake, perhaps emotions took over and started to chase the retreating horsemen, leaving prepared positions too early.
The war style of east had an answer to this by changing retreat in panic dispertion into victorious counter attack. That is what happened.
This did not escape the attention of Urlich von Jungingen, who seeing what forces were attacking on the Order‘s left win, had a breakdown and was said to have even started crying. His strategy lay in pieces, compounded by the irresponsible action of his left wing. But one had to wait for the end of the battle.
On the right wing a battle of unbelievable emotions was taking place between flower of the knighthood of both sides, from which there could only be one victor.
The ferocity of this battle is best shown by the painter Jan Matejko in his painting the battle of Grunwald.
To save the situation, the Grand Master of the Order sends into the battle field his 16 elite guest heavy armoured knights, amongst them the Chelminski Standard.
Not finding any resistance to their charge, they came very close to Jagiello‘s position. The strength of the 16 units must have been at least 4000 knights.
Strangely, the Polish knights did not identify them as Knights of the ćross and one of the knights, the standard bearer of Meissen, was even able to attack the King. Some said there was a danger of the loss of the Grand Battle Flag of Poland and for a moment the Knights of the Order believed in victory.
The 16 brigades were a substantial force, composed of the elite of European knighthood, which should have played a major role. But this they failed to do. Why?

One factor was the Chelminski Standard, which disbanded its banner and surrendered to Jagiello. This behaviour must have caused great confusion amongst the knights of of other brigades and it is not impossible that other units might have taken a similar decision. The confusion might have been only temporary but it was long enough to let the Polish knights recognise the Order‘s foreign guests, summon reinforcements and the returning Lithuanian and Ruthenes knights to deal with those who had no intentions of surrendering.
After the battle the Teutonic Order often stated that the battle was lost because of the change of allegiance of the Chelminski brigade.
Polish historians ignore this fact. I agree that one standard could not have won the battle, but the confusion this created in the ranks of the other standards meant that the Order was decidedly right in saying that the action to a large extent helped to sway the course of the battle.
Nicholas of Pilewice and John of Pulkowo probably spent the time of the battle in Jagiello‘s camp, and shortly afterwards they left together to conquer the castle of Kowalewo which they placed at the disposal of the King.
After the Peace Treaty, the Order, with German ruthlessness and thoroughness, began to hunt down the members and leaders of the Chelmiski brigade. This was contrary to the Peace Treaty.
The first to be seized, in his home, was Nicholas of Pilewice, and on him were found fragments of Polish flags as well as anti-Teutonic Order correspondence from Poland. It is interesting to note the flag fragments - could it be that the remaining fragments were kept on the Polish side. If so, with whom?
Could they be used in this way to validate meetings?
Without the court or any reasons given, Nicholas was executed. Shortly later, the same fate met Nicholas Rynski and others, whilst the remainder fled to Poland to save their lives.
The Prus knights were certainly not amongst the victors of Grunwald. This conclusion does not mean that they were not active on Jagiello‘s side, but only that the political short sightedness of the Poles was great. Were the Poles and their allies the victors at Grunwald? Yes, but although they totally destroyed the Teutonic Knights forces, unfortunately they did not win the war. This phenomenon was quite often repeated in the history of Poland, but nobody draws conclusions from this.
My polemics are with the source, “ The Great War with Teutonic Order in the year 1409-1411”, the author Stefan M. Kuczynski, published in Warsaw 1966. The maps, slightly re-orientated, are derived from the above work.

Slawomir Klec Pilewski
20.02 2010